In Part 1 we discussed the pitfalls of the “human tripwire“ strategy. In Part 2 we discussed how Russia complicates NATO defense planning. Now we finally reached Part 3 where I will demonstrate why the spiderweb defense can frustrate Russia’s defense planning.
Blast From the Past
We must not forget that only a few years ago French President Emmanuel Macron called NATO ‘brain dead‘ and former U.S. president Donald Trump discussed the U.S. leaving the alliance. With that said, we should not assume the permanence of current NATO unity, especially as cracks appear. This necessitates the creation of a defense plan that can survive the political risk of American or European disengagement.
In the later stages of the Cold War the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) authored a policy paper titled The spiderweb defense, also know as Confidence-Building Defense. This strategy builds confidence in NATO because NATO would gain a credible deterrent against an invasion while the adversary would feel confident that NATO’s military buildup does not signal an imminent invasion.
We will now use the description of the strategy provided to us by the author to understand how the spiderweb defense operates.
This nonliteral diagram represents the SAS nonoffensive "spiderweb" defense. An invader's first contact with the web is a network of sensors and mines along the border.
Attacking forces that get beyond this area meet the main mesh of the web-dispersed infantry teams which fight from protected (hardened) positions, represented by black squares in the diagram.
The farther from the border, the more closely the web units are spaced. Web units are connected to each other and to mobile forces by an underground communications network.
The "spider" forces, indicated by black arrows in the diagram, are armored and mobile. Spiders move throughout the web as needed to delay, channel, block, and destroy invaders.
Lacking logistic support for long-range attacks, the spiders' mobility is confined to home (web) territory; thus they are nonoffensive.
Modern Spiderweb
This strategy appears even more useful thanks to new technology.
The diagram only shows sensors at the border, but the proliferation of drones (flying sensors) ensures the proliferation of sensors throughout the battlefield.
Constellations of low cost satellites decreased the importance of dug-in communication lines. For example, Ukraine’s use of Starlink satellites serves as a template for wartime satellite communication
Increase in firepower in combination with no increase in the maneuver speed of armies gives defensive soldiers an advantage over offensive invaders.
NATO is currently situated to take advantage of this strategy. As I wrote two weeks ago, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 prompted NATO to create multinational battlegroups to defend NATO’s eastern flank. After Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, NATO allies increased troops and material sent to the frontline states. Germany was designated to lead the defense of Lithuania, one of the three Baltic states.
An article in War on the Rocks further delves into this strategy with regards to Germany’s relationship to Lithuania. In this example Germany plays the spider
Germany recently announced the establishment of a permanent headquarters in Lithuania for an additional German brigade manned by 50 to 60 staff. The rest of the brigade would be stationed in Germany and regularly rotate into the country for training. To further enhance Germany’s ability to play the spider, Berlin could pre-position supplies in dispersed, protected locations, mostly for rapid resupply of Lithuanian national forces in times of war.
while Lithuanian forces spin the web.
Providing the web, the Lithuanian military could store a significant arsenal of shoulder-fired anti-tank munitions, portable drones, and towed artillery platforms for the newest guided artillery shells. In a conflict, these would be moved quickly between redundant, camouflaged, and fortified firing positions, and complemented by guided anti-ship missile batteries, which are less expensive than naval surface ships.
Robots Taking The Lead
The German spider and the Lithuanian web will both be powered by robotics. In Part 2 of this series I described Russia’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy towards the three Baltic states. One of those A2/AD methods involved using Russian naval vessels to block the Baltic states’s access to the Baltic Sea. Normally one would employ naval vessels from the Baltic states to take out the Russian ships.
This is not an optimal strategy for the Baltic states because the high cost of both the naval vessel itself and maintenance. A few months ago I wrote about a Marine weapon called the NEMESIS, an unmanned vehicle capable of firing the anti-ship Naval Strike Missile. This robotic weapon system provides cost-effective coastal defense for the three Baltic states, including Lithuania.
In the beginning of the Russia’s recent invasion I discussed a powerful drone tag team the U.S. sent to Ukraine. This tag team consists of a long range ISR drone called the Puma and a loitering munition called Switchblade. The Puma flies around the battlefield collecting intelligence, when it finds the location of a juicy target it passes that data directly to the Switchblade loitering munition which then moves to neutralize the target.
I can imagine the destructive potential of the Lithuanian defenders if they had access to thousands of Puma-Switchblade teams. Lithuania may especially need the tank killing Switchblade-600 given the surprisingly high usage of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) in Ukraine. The combination of loitering munitions and shoulder fired missiles contain the potential to halt an invader in their tracks.
Conclusion
The United States debt to GDP ratio stands at 125%. One of these days America’s budgetary chickens will come home to roost. To lessen the risk of America’s poor budget discipline, American policy makers should pursue their goals in a cost-effective manner. My series demonstrates how American policy makers can ensure its defense commitments to NATO’s most vulnerable members without committing to stationing tens of thousands of US troops in the three Baltic states.