Battle Map Update
The transition phase of the Russia/Ukraine war nears its end. As I wrote last week, Russia evacuated its positions in the north and focused its forces on the southeastern portion of Ukraine. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) defines three battlegrounds emerging in southeast Ukraine: Eastern Ukraine, Kharkiv and Izyum, and the Southern Axis.
Eastern Ukraine - The Battle for Mariupol
Russia made great progress in the battle of Mariupol last week. Russian forces cut through the city and left only a few pockets of Ukrainian resistance. Mariupol remains the main battleground in Ukraine, once Russia takes the city that title should move to our next battleground.
Kharkiv and Izyum - The Battle for the Donbas
As Russian forces fighting elsewhere in Ukraine reposition, we see the battle for The Donbas begin. The fighting centers along three cities, Izyum, Rubizhne, and Popansa. If Russia can break out southeast from Izyum and west from Popasna then they can surround the Ukrainian forces fighting in Rubizhne. But if Ukraine holds the line then they will deny Russia its goal of capturing the entirety of The Donbas. If Ukraine makes progress in our next battleground then denying Russia The Donbas becomes a real possibility.
Southern Axis - The Battle for Kherson
Ukrainian forces continue to make a push for Kherson, they recaptured territory on the periphery of the Russian gains. If Ukraine recaptures more territory then Russia must redirect its forces from advancing in The Donbas to defending its gains in Kherson. New weapons sent by the United States to Ukraine could help Ukrainian forces advance in Kherson.
Weapon Sales Update
In my Week 3 Recap, I asked two questions regarding the United States sale of Switchblade drones to Ukraine.
Question 1: Of the drones we are sending, what is the breakdown between Switchblade 300s and Switchblade 600s?
While the weapon sale I discussed in March only included Switchblade 300s, Bloomberg reported on April 4, 2022 that the United States sent Switchblade 600s to Ukraine in a recent weapon transfer. The extended range of this 50 pound drone gives Ukrainian operators the ability to hit Russian targets up to 40 kilometers away. While this batch of weapons only includes 10 Switchblade 600’s, I expect more to follow shortly.
That answers my first question, now on to the second.
Question 2: If we are sending the Switchblade 300 are we also sending ISR drones to pair with them?
The weapon sale I discussed in our Week 3 Recap did not include the Puma Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) drone. That changed as the United States sent Puma ISR drones to Ukraine in the same new batch of weapon sales as the Switchblade 600. The Puma’s added value derives from its endurance and connectivity. The Puma can stay aloft for 6 1/2 hours and pass precise targeting data to the Switchblade drone, which can stay aloft for only 15 minutes. The video below from Aerovironment explains the value added by pairing the Switchblade drone with the Puma ISR drone.
In my Week 3 Recap I also discussed Slovakia’s willingness to send their S-300 anti-air system to Ukraine. This week we received confirmation that this system is headed on its way to Ukraine. Armed with Pumas, Switchblades, and a new S-300 system we will see if Ukraine can halt Russian advances in the Donbas while pushing forward in Kherson. Ukraine should focus on recapturing as much territory as possible because Russia may remain in Ukraine for the long-term.
De-Nazification Update
TASS, a leading Russian language news outlet, reports the following paragraph at the end of many of its news articles about the Russia/Ukraine war.
He [Russian President Vladimir Putin] stressed that Moscow had no plans of occupying Ukrainian territories, but aims to demilitarize and de-Nazify the country.
In our Week 4 Recap I discussed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s narrow definition of denazification. Lavrov stated that denazification merely entails the repeal of laws targeted against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. If one suspects that the plague of nazi ideology permeates Ukrainian society, then removing the ideology must entail occupying Ukraine for decades. Lavrov’s narrowing of the denazification demand could provide evidence that Russia does not plan on occupying Ukraine for the long term, but a recent essay suggests otherwise.
Timofey Sergeytsev, a pro-Kremlin Russian filmmaker, wrote an essay published in RIA Novrosti detailing a more expansive vision of denazification. In this essay, amplified by Russian state media organizations, Sergeytsev states that Ukrainian identity is artificial.
Ukrainism is an artificial anti-Russian construct that does not have its own civilizational content; it’s a subordinate element of an alien and unnatural civilization.
He further argues that the artificial Ukrainian identity should be replaced with the area's true Russian identity.
De-Nazifying will inevitably also be a de-Ukrainizing, i.e., rejecting the large-scale artificial overblowing of the ethnic component in self-identification of the population of the territories of the historical Minor Russia and New Russia.
How long will it take for Russia to impose the correct identity on Ukraine?
The de-Nazifying time frame is no less than one generation that needs to be born, brought up and to have reached maturity during the process of de-Nazifying.
It looks like Russian thought leaders understand that it will take at least a generation to replace Ukrainian identity with a Russian identity. We will see if the Russian populace approves of the occupational measures necessary to change Ukraine’s identity.
This concludes our sixth weekly recap