Russia’s A2/AD
In Part 1 of this series I discussed the current defense strategy NATO uses for the three Baltic states. I attempted to demonstrate the insufficiency of the “human tripwire“ strategy, therefore necessitating the creation of a new strategy. But before we discuss this new strategy, we must take stock of Russia’s military position vis-à-vis Ukraine.
Over two month ago I described China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy. China utilizes the A2/AD strategy to prevent the U.S. Navy from freely operating in waters close to China’s shores. Russia employs a version of this strategy as well. I previously wrote about Russia’s use of the A2/AD strategy to prevent NATO naval vessels from operating in the Black Sea. Russia also utilizes A2/AD in the Baltics, both on land and sea.
In a hypothetical Russian invasion of the Baltics, one should expect Russia to focus on isolating the Baltic states from their NATO allies. If Russia successfully completes this mission, one should expect a quick Baltic surrender. To achieve this outcome Russia needs to deny NATO allies the ability to resupply the three Baltic states by using anti-air systems, land-attack missiles, and anti-ship missiles.
Air, Land, and Sea
Russia placed their vaunted S-300 and S-400 anti-air systems close to the Baltic states’s borders. As I have written before, these anti-air systems effectively grounded both Ukrainian and Russian 4th generation aircraft. While I would love to see if Ukraine can penetrate Russia’s anti-air systems using U.S. 4th generation F-16’s, I would not volunteer for the first missions.
Russia also uses land-based anti-ship missiles and land-based land-attack missiles to deter NATO. These missiles can strike NATO’s land-based assets across the entirety of NATO’s eastern flank while the anti-ship missiles can attack NATO naval assets in the Baltic Sea.
Russia can also lob anti-ship missiles and land-attack missiles from its naval assets in the sea. The range of these missiles can span the entirety of NATO if Russia positions its naval assets correctly.
Russian air defense systems can preclude NATO from resupplying the Baltics through the air while Russia’s anti-ship missiles can halt NATO resupply missions through the Baltic Sea. But, Russia’s land-attack missiles may not halt NATO resupply by land. This is where the Suwalki Gap enters the discussion.
Suwalki Gap
In the maps above I bet you noticed a strange red enclave. This enclave is called Kalingrad, Russia gained this territory at the end of World War II and it still serves as their main entry point to the Baltic Sea.
To the east of Kalingrad we see the western border of Belarus, a state which allowed Russia to use its territory to stage the invasion of Kiev. The tiny strip of land connecting the eastern edge of Kalingrad with the western border of Belarus is called the Suwalki Gap. If Russia can occupy the Suwalki gap during a future invasion of the Baltic states, they can cut off NATO ground re-supply through Poland
Military planners plan for the worst-case scenario. What I just described is NATO’s worst case scenario regarding the defense of the Baltics. Russia’s anti-air systems, anti-ship missiles, and land-attack missiles in combination with closing the Suwalki Gap could strand the Baltic countries from their NATO partners. At that point NATO’s “human tripwire“ appears to resemble a dud. How can NATO replace its dud? The U.S. marines may hold the answer.
Stand-In Forces
I previously wrote about General David Berger’s plan to overhaul the U.S. Marine Corp. The U.S. Marines will ditch bigger, slower equipment for smaller, faster replacements. They expect to win a fight against China within China’s A2/AD bubble. To accomplish this, General Berger created a concept called Stand-In Forces (SIF).
SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area
To translate into English, The U.S Marines will be small, fast, and easy to maintain and sustain while packing a serious punch. But what does it mean to operate in a contested area? Let’s examine one of the key pieces of equipment for the U.S. Army, helicopters.
Moreover, on the rare occasions when adversaries fielded an air force, the U.S. Air Force quickly achieved unchallenged air supremacy over the battlefield. As a result, the Army has been able to rely on helicopters for a wide range of operations, including close air support, large-scale troop assaults, and reliable resupply deliveries.
No longer. Few, if any, of those permissive conditions exist today in Ukraine, and even fewer will likely exist in future high-intensity conflicts. Both sides have suffered enormous helicopter losses so far — with the Russians alone believed to have lost more than 170 helicopters to date. That compares with fewer than the 75 U.S. helicopters lost in combat during two decades of fighting Iraq and Afghanistan — far less deadly conflicts where the enemy had no air force and virtually no shoulder-fired missiles, much less swarms of lethal drones or advanced air defenses.
NATO should use this moment as an opportunity to rethink how to defend its eastern flank. While some argue for the stationing of tens of thousands of more troops to defend the Baltics, NATO could embark on a different path. Luckily for NATO, they can dust-off an old playbook for this occasion. In our final installment we will finally examine the spiderweb defense.