I hear increasing chatter referencing a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. On August 13, 2022 the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stated
Russian forces may be reprioritizing advances in northeastern Donetsk Oblast in order to draw attention from Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Southern Ukraine
The Warzone’s Ukraine Situation Report also discusses the counteroffensive.
The Russian frontline in Kherson may be on its last legs as Ukrainian forces continue their counteroffensive toward the Dnieper River.
Before we get too excited, let’s examine the peculiarities surrounding Russia’s position in Kherson and the fundamentals dictating the success of offensives.
Russia’s Peculiar Position
First, we need to understand the location of our battlefield. All countries contain governmental subdivisions like provinces (Canada) or states (America). Ukraine subdivides their country into Oblasts with Kherson denoted as one of those Oblasts.
As you can see in the map above, the Dnieper River bisects Ukraine and the Kherson Oblast. The Dnieper River represents a natural defense line. Case in point, the Austrian military suggested that if Russian forces overran Ukrainian forces fighting in east, they will retreat to the west bank of the Dnieper river. One can then conclude that the east bank of the river represents a natural defense line for the Russians, if they can push that far.
The main city in Kherson Oblast shares its namesake, Kherson. Russia currently controls the city of Kherson which lies on the west bank of the Dnieper River. This explains the peculiarities surrounding Russia’s position in Kherson. For Russia, this position remains incredibly exposed. No one wants to fight with their backs towards a gigantic body of water.
Making matters worse, to get supplies to the Russian forces west of the Dnieper River one must cross a bridge. The map below highlights three bridges one can use to cross the river. If those bridges cease to operate then Russian forces west of the Dnieper River face supply challenges.
Russia’s worst fears played out as Ukrainian forces struck those bridges with the feared High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Those strikes compelled Russia to use slow, inefficient ferries to move supplies across the river. We can already see the effect of this new battlefield reality. ISW reports
Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim reported that unspecified Russian military command elements left upper Kherson Oblast and relocated to the left bank of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian military leadership is concerned about being trapped on the wrong side of the river.
A month and a half ago I wrote the following in a previous article
Based on current trends I see no reason to expect major changes in the frontlines. While the HIMARS rocket launcher will help Ukraine, I do not believe it will decisively alter the battlefield.
Does this make my previous prediction incorrect?
The Fundamentals of Offense
It depends on the definition of the word major. I admit that I should have anticipated Ukraine attempting to destroy the bridges allowing resupply to Kherson, I made a similar observation regarding the Kerch Strait Bridge and Crimea.
But, I do not think a Ukrainian offensive in Kherson east of the Dnieper River will succeed as of right now. Let's take to heart the following quote from Robert Scales, former commandant of the Army War College
In war, firepower favors the defensive and maneuver favors the offensive
Firepower is easy to define, it encompasses the ability to fire fatal ammunition farther and faster. Western weapons gave Ukraine great firepower
Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) - Javelin
Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) - Stinger
Towed Artillery - M777 howitzer
Rocket Artillery - M142 HIMARS
Maneuver presents a challenge to define, so I will let the Marine Corp Association do it for me.
The key element of maneuver warfare is the disruption and disorganization of the enemy rather than a fixation with the kill-this-and-kill-that syndrome. The maneuver style of war is more psychological in its destruction of the enemy, whereas firepower-attrition war is more physical. With maneuver warfare, the precept is to create for the enemy as many unanticipated and threatening situations as possible, while at the same time seeking out tactical advantages on the battlefield.
In the Russian-Ukrainian war I see no game changing capability regarding maneuver. But I will leave you with three potential game changers
Ukrainians receive the F-16 and training to use it for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions. The F-16 is the U.S. cheapest, most abundant, and easiest to maintain fourth generation strike fighters. Ukrainians can knock holes in Russia's air defense using the AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). This opens up opportunity to use air power against Russian artillery. With air defense and artillery degraded, maneuver is possible.
Looking into the future, I wonder if the Switchblade 300 loitering munition could be programmed with AI capable of finding shoulder fired missile launchers. Once it finds the launcher the drone neutralizes the threat. Whether or not the enemy troop lives is of no concern. A group of soldiers without anti-air and anti-tank shoulder fired missile launchers remain vulnerable to attacks from tanks, helicopters and planes. This once again opens up the battlefield for maneuver.
Looking even further into the future, speed represents one of the most important aspects of maneuver. The U.S. military hopes that the Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN) program will give the U.S. that advantage. TITAN will collect vast amount of battlefield data, analyze the information, and give commanders options about how to best neutralize threats. Militaries that can field this type of system will move faster and smarter than their opponents, hence increased maneuverability.
Conclusion
Russia will probably not be able to hold their position on the west bank of the Dnieper River, but I do not think Ukraine will be able to push their offensive east of the river. My original prediction remains, large scale offensives remain out of reach from both armies until the introduction of new technology and tactics which enables maneuver.