Conventional vs Unconventional Warfare
Israel finds itself again in the vortex of conflict. On October 7th, 2023 Hamas massacred 1,200 Jews, the most in a single day since the Holocaust. Israel responded with Operation Swords of Iron aimed at annihilating Hamas. This operation continues Israel's 70-year tradition of excellence in conventional warfare.
Conventional warfare entails the use of state-based armed forces against an adversary. Unconventional warfare allows a state to use force against an adversary while avoiding the initiation of a conventional war. A state using unconventional warfare might also employ an armed force not officially linked to it, known as a proxy. This proxy may operate independently of an official state apparatus, know as a stateless proxy. Israel’s dominance in conventional warfare drove its enemies to rely on using stateless proxies to conduct unconventional warfare.
Israel vs Arabs
The creation of the state of Israel triggered the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, a conventional conflict pitting Israel against the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Palestinian forces. Israel showcased the effectiveness of their conventional forces against larger conventional foes in that war as well as in the 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Since the Yom Kippur War, Israel’s Arab neighbors avoided conventional war with Israel, paving the way for the 1979 Camp David Accords with Egypt and the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace-treaty. Those deals secured Israel’s western, southern, and eastern borders from conventional attack. Dominance in conventional warfare bought Israel relative peace with its Arab neighbors, but the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran birthed a new adversary.
The Islamic Revolution of Iran
In 1979 Islamic radicals overthrew the pro-Western Shah of Iran. Overnight Iran became a Shiite Islamic theocracy hell-bent on securing and spreading their Islamic revolution. To accomplish this Iran created a new multi-service armed force separate from the original Iranian Armed Forces (Artesh) called the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC).
The IRGC developed their preference for unconventional warfare during the 1980’s. Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-led Iraqi government declared war on Iran in 1980 which lasted for eight years. With both side’s armed forces failing to gain an advantage in conventional warfare, Iran began experimenting using unconventional warfare via stateless proxies in Lebanon and Iraq. Ultimately, Iran refined its skills in unconventional warfare, becoming adept at leveraging stateless proxies.
Israel vs Iran (Hamas & Hezbollah)
Hamas (a Palestinian, Islamic, and genocidal organization) emerged from the fires of the 1987 Palestinian Intifada. Fatah, Hamas’s Palestinian competitor, differed by accepting Israel’s right to exist during the 1993 Oslo Accord. This led to increased ties between Iran and Hamas culminating in Hamas’s victory in the 2006 Gazan election and financial rescue by Iran. After Iran rescued Hamas from bankruptcy, Hamas defeated Fatah in their brief 2007 war. This conflict led to the current Palestinian governing dynamic, with Hamas ruling Gaza while Fatah controls Judea and Samaria.
Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah (Iran’s Lebanese stateless proxy) formed with the help of the IRGC. Israel fought Hezbollah alongside Lebanese allies during the 1985-2000 South Lebanon Conflict, then again during a brief war in 2006. Hezbollah’s impressive skills led the U.S. Armed Forces Journal to call Hezbollah’s “defiant resistance” the “classic example of a hybrid threat.” With Hezbollah entrenched in Lebanon and Hamas entrenched in Gaza, Iran possessed two stateless proxies capable of engaging in unconventional warfare against Israel.
Israel vs Iran (Houthis)
Iran recently added another stateless proxy to their anti-Israel alliance. The Shiite Houthis managed to dethrone the Sunni-led Yemeni government in 2015, successfully defended themselves against Saudi Arabia’s invasion, and maintained control of a significant chunk of western Yemen through today, including the capital city and main port.
Sensing their usefulness, Iran supplied the Houthis with an extensive arsenal of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones. These weapons enabled the Houthis to significantly slow down maritime trade through the Red Sea, inflicting substantial economic damage on Israel. In the past only legitimate states possessed the means project power several hundred kilometers from their territory, but the Houthis managed to succeed as a stateless proxy.
Conclusion
Iranian sub-national proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis) use unconventional warfare to besiege Israel from the west, north, and south. Israel faces political complexities in countering unconventional warfare using conventional warfare.
As Robert Kaplan discussed in Revenge of Geography (2012):
States like Nigeria, Yemen, Somalia, to name but a few, barely function, and are besieged by substate militias. The Palestinians, particularly in Gaza, have engaged in violence to protest their condition, even as they have eschewed the compromises required for statehood. The same with Hezbollah in Lebanon, which could have toppled the government in Beirut anytime it wanted, but chose not to. A state has to abide by certain rules and thus makes for an easier target. And so we have a new phenomenon in this age of megacities and mass media: the power of statelessness.
Next time we will discuss how to counter the power of statelessness.